Introduction
To the extent that prices are sticky a central bank can become a source of unnecessary macroeconomic ‡uctuations. How can this problem be avoided? The classical answer to that question is that monetary policy needs to respect the Taylor principle according to which the nominal interest rate is adjusted by more than one-for-one in response to changes in in ‡ation. 1 The reason is that this is a su¢ cient condition for determinacy, i.e., local uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium, in the context of many New-Keynesian (NK) models. Sveen and Weinke (2005) show, however, that the Taylor principle can easily fail to guarantee determinacy if it is taken into account that …rms do not only post prices but also make investment decisions.
2 Speci…cally, we demonstrate that there exists a non-standard indeterminacy region which obtains for policies that respect the Taylor principle (in addition to the usual region which corresponds to interest rate rules that are inconsistent with that principle). In a nutshell, the reason is as follows. Investment has counteracting e¤ects on the determination of in ‡ation. On the one hand, investment demand increases in ‡ation, but on the other hand, the resulting additional capital tends to increase labor productivity thereby decreasing in ‡ation by the time when it becomes productive. To the extent that the central bank follows the Taylor principle, the long real interest rate could therefore drop in the presence of an increase in real economic activity that is unrelated to the economy's fundamentals. Under those circumstances such a boom would be rationalized ex post. The potential failure of the Taylor principle in the presence of endogenous capital accumulation also motivates the work by Carlstrom and Fuerst 1 See, e.g., Taylor (1999) , Clarida et al. (2000) and Woodford (2001 Woodford ( , 2003 . 2 For an early example of a model which demonstrates that the Taylor principle might fail in the presence of endogenous capital accumulation, see Dupor (2001) . His conclusion that a passive interest rate rule is needed to guarantee determinacy is, however, speci…c to his continuous time framework, as observed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) . Some problematic aspects of the Taylor principle that are unrelated to the presence of capital accumulation are discussed in Edge and Rudd (2002) , Røisland (2003) , Galí et al. (2004) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) , Natvik (2009) , among others. expected rather than current in ‡ation generally creates indeterminacy. 3 Other papers have followed up on the implications of endogenous capital accumulation for determinacy in the context of NK models. Examples include the recent work by Huang and Meng (2007) , Sveen and Weinke (2007) , Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) and Huang et al. (2009) . We note, however, that those analyses of determinacy have been conducted in the context of highly stylized models which are limited in their ability to account for actual observed business-cycle ‡uctuations.
The goal of the present paper is to analyze determinacy in the context of an empirically plausible model of the U.S. business cycle. Our motivation is twofold. First, capital accumulation is a key feature of medium-scale macroeconomic models which have been estimated and shown to account fairly well for postwar U.S. business-cycle ‡uctuations. 4 It is therefore natural to ask whether the indeterminacy issues that are linked to the presence of capital accumulation still exist once that feature is combined with other bells and whistles that increase the empirical relevance of NK models. Second, some of those bells and whistles have been considered in isolation in the above mentioned literature precisely because they are also relevant for the determinacy properties of NK models. Our model is similar to the frameworks proposed by Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) . Its main features are an external consumption habit, sticky prices and wages, price-indexation in wagesetting, and variable capital utilization as well as …rm-speci…c capital accumulation that is subject to a convex investment adjustment cost.
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3 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) also analyze current-looking interest rate rules and …nd that the Taylor Principle guarantees determinacy unless prices are extremely sticky. This result is, however, overturned in the presence of …rm-speci…c capital accumulation, as shown in Sveen and Weinke (2005) . Other related papers are Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) and Hornstein and Wolman (2005) . The former discusses the possibility of global instability, whereas the latter is concerned with the consequences of non-zero in ‡ation for determinacy in a Taylor-type pricing model. 4 See, e.g., Altig et al. (2005) , Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) . 5 Let us note that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) also analyze indeterminacy under currentlooking monetary policy in the context of their model. This is, however, not the main focus of their work and it is therefore natural that they did not choose to disentangle the respective roles of the model features for that particular issue. In our analysis this aspect is at center stage.
Two sets of results emerge. First, under a current-looking interest rate rule we …nd that the Taylor principle is not a su¢ cient condition for determinacy in the presence of an empirically plausible degree of price stickiness. This con…rms our earlier results in Weinke (2005, 2007) . Second, we analyze the stability properties of interest rate rules prescribing that the nominal interest rate is set as a function of future expected in ‡ation. Importantly, the results resemble, at least qualitatively, to the corresponding outcomes under a current-looking interest rate rule. This is in stark contrast with some of the …ndings in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) , Huang and Meng (2007) , Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) and Huang et al. (2009) who have found dramatic di¤erences in the stability properties implied by current-looking and forward-looking interest rate rules. We explain why this result does not hold up in the context of an empirically relevant medium-scale model. Finally, and consistent with earlier …ndings, the present paper also shows that the indeterminacy problem can be solved if the nominal interest rate is set not only as a function of in ‡ation but is also adjusted in response to changes in (current or future expected) output or past nominal interest rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model structure. In Section 3 we consider the resulting linearized equilibrium conditions. Our results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We use a NK model with complete markets. Sunspot shocks are assumed to be the only source of aggregate uncertainty. There is a continuum of …rms and a continuum of households. Each …rm is the monopolistically competitive supplier of a di¤erentiated good and we assume Calvo (1983) pricing. We also allow for the possibility of indexation in price-setting. Firms use labor and capital in their production. Capital accumulation takes place at the …rm level with the additional capital resulting from an investment decision becoming productive with a one period delay. We also assume a convex investment adjustment cost as well as variable capital utilization. Period utility is assumed to be separable in its two arguments leisure and consumption with external habit persistence. Each household is the monopolistically competitive supplier of a di¤erentiated type of labor and we assume sticky wages à la Erceg et al. (2000) , i.e., each household gets to reoptimize its wage with a constant and exogenous probability. We also assume price indexation in wagesetting. Since the details of the model have been discussed in Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) we turn directly to the resulting linearized equilibrium conditions.
Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We restrict attention to a linear approximation around a zero in ‡ation steady state.
In what follows variables are expressed in terms of log deviations from their steady state values except for the nominal interest rate, r t , wage in ‡ation, ! t , and price in ‡ation, t , which denote the levels of the respective variables. The consumption
Euler equation reads
where c t denotes aggregate consumption and E t is the expectational operator conditional on information available through time t. Parameter h 2 [0; 1] measures an external consumption habit. We have also used the notation log to indicate the time discount rate. In the latter de…nition parameter denotes the household's subjective discount factor. The law of motion of aggregate capital, k t , is
where i t is aggregate investment. The investment Euler equation is given by
where parameter measures the investment adjustment cost. Moreover, q t denotes Tobin's Q whose Euler equation takes the following form
with r K t w t (k t + b t n t ) denoting the average real shadow rental price of capital.
In the latter de…nition we have used the notation w t for the average real wage and n t for aggregate labor. Finally, parameter is the depreciation rate of capital. Up to the …rst order, aggregate production, y t , is pinned down by
where parameter denotes the capital share and b t measures the extent to which capital is utilized. The wage in ‡ation equation is obtained from averaging and aggregating optimal wage-setting decisions on the part of households. It takes the following form
where ! t denotes wage in ‡ation, and mrs t 1 1 h (c t hc t 1 ) + n t measures the average marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure. Finally, parameter w indicates the degree of price indexation in wage-setting and we have also used the de…nition w
In the latter expression parameter w denotes the probability that a household is not allowed to reoptimize its nominal wage in any given period, while parameter " N measures the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of labor. The identity w t = w t 1 + ! t t must also hold. The price in ‡ation equation reads
where mc t w t (y t n t ) denotes the average real marginal cost and parameter measures the degree of indexation in price-setting. Finally, parameter p is a function of the model's structural parameters which is computed numerically using the method developed in Woodford (2005) . 6 Let us also note that cost-minimization
where parameter b measures the cost of varying the capital utilization rate. The aggregate goods market clearing condition is given by
where c y 1
denotes the steady state consumption to output ratio. In the latter de…nition we have denoted the frictionless desired markup by
with " denoting the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of goods. To close the model we assume that monetary policy is conducted according to a simple rule which takes the following form
where j; k 2 f0; 1g. Parameter r measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, whereas parameters and y denote the long-run responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in the associated endogenous variables. 6 We have used the code developed by Altig et al. (2005) , which can be found at http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lchrist/research.htm
Results
Our goal is to explore what are desirable features of interest rate rules in the sense that they guarantee determinacy. To this end we use the theoretical framework developed so far. Our medium-scale model also allows us to understand why some results in the previous related literature are not robust.
Baseline Parameter Values
The period length is one quarter. Most of our baseline parameter values are justi…ed in Altig. et al. (2005) . We deviate from their work in the parameter values for priceand wage-setting.
7 Conventional values are assigned to the respective stickiness parameters and the corresponding degrees of indexation are roughly in line with the estimates obtained by Smets and Wouters (2007) . Our baseline choices are summarized in table 1.
[ Table 1 Let us …rst consider a simple rule prescribing that the nominal interest rate is a linear function of current in ‡ation only, i.e., we set r = y = j = k = 0 in (10).
We ask what combinations of values for the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient, , and the price stickiness parameter, , result in a determinate equilibrium. The result is shown in the upper panel of …gure 1.
[ Figure 1 about here]
An in ‡ation response coe¢ cient strictly larger than one is necessary but not su¢ cient for determinacy. In fact, a large range of values of parameter that 7 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) follow a similar strategy.
meet the Taylor principle are inconsistent with determinacy. The intuition relies on the economic mechanism described in Sveen and Weinke (2005) . The presence of capital accumulation implies that an increase in real activity that is unrelated to the economy's fundamentals might be rationalized ex post. The reason is that an increase in current investment has counteracting e¤ects on marginal costs. First, the additional investment demand tends to increase the current marginal cost. Second, one period later when the resulting additional capital becomes productive the marginal cost tends to decrease. It is therefore possible that the long real interest rate decreases, if the central bank follows the Taylor principle. In this case, the investment boom can be rationalized ex post. Interestingly, the shape of the non-standard indeterminacy area shown in the upper panel of …gure 1 is qualitatively similar to its counterpart in Sveen and Weinke (2005) . Let us also notice that the non-standard indeterminacy area, i.e., the one that is associated with values of the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient that meet the Taylor principle, has an upper limit which is increasing in the price stickiness. The respective economic reasons for the existence of the upper and the lower limit of the nonstandard indeterminacy area are developed in Sveen and Weinke (2005) . However, let us notice already here that the lower limit of the non-standard indeterminacy area is generally very close to the standard critical value of one. In other words, the size of the determinacy area that separates the standard and non-standard indeterminacy areas is quantitatively unimportant. We will come back to this later in the text. rations in mind we can understand the role of price-stickiness for the upper limit of the nonstandard indeterminacy area. Other things being equal, a higher degree of forward-lookingness in price-setting (i.e., a larger value of the price stickiness parameter ) makes the impact of the future drop in the marginal cost on current in ‡ation larger. The negative impact of the expected future drop in the marginal cost on the relevant long real interest rate does therefore also become larger. This in turn requires a stronger responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in in ‡ation (as measured by coe¢ cient ) in order to guarantee determinacy. Finally, let us also observe that the extent to which an investment boom implies a drop in future expected marginal costs depends crucially on the smoothness of aggregate demand.
Much of the related existing literature has focused on forward-looking speci…ca-tions of monetary policy. In order to relate to this strand of the literature we now analyze an interest rate rule according to which the nominal interest rate is a linear function of one period ahead expected in ‡ation, i.e., we set r = y = 0, combined with j = 1, in (10). Once again, we ask what combinations of values for the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient, , and the price stickiness parameter, , imply a determinate equilibrium. The result is shown in the lower panel of …gure 1. Also in this case we …nd that an in ‡ation response coe¢ cient strictly larger than one is necessary but not su¢ cient for determinacy. More importantly, the non-standard indeterminacy region is larger but qualitatively similar to its counterpart under a current-looking interest rate rule. This is in stark contrast with the …ndings in Carlstrom and Fuerst for almost all combinations of values for the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient, , and the price stickiness parameter, , whereas we show that the size of the non-standard indeterminacy area is not much larger than its counterpart under a current-looking interest rate rule. The di¤erence in results is a consequence of the empirically plausible degree of smoothness in aggregate demand that is embedded in our model. indeterminacy is therefore very limited. Next, we will use our model to further 9 Let us also note that the result in Sveen and Weinke (2007) , according to which the size of the non-standard indeterminacy area is increasing in wage stickiness, holds up in the context of the medium-scale model which is used in the present paper. This result is available upon request. 10 In each case, the size of this region is, however, so small that it is not even possible to see it with the eye in …gure 1. elaborate on the economic mechanisms behind our results.
Inspecting the Mechanism
We now use our medium-scale model and disentangle the respective roles of its main features. Starting from the baseline case we introduce one change at a time.
Speci…cally, we hold the price stickiness parameter, , …xed at its baseline value, that an increase in parameter h does not only increase the relative importance of past consumption for the current consumption decision, it also reduces the importance of the long real interest rate for that decision. In the second row of …gure 2 this is re ‡ected by the fact that for most values that are larger than the baseline value the upper bound of the non-standard indeterminacy area is increasing in the value of parameter h.
The economic mechanisms inspected so far substantiate our earlier claim that it is the empirically plausible degree of smoothness in aggregate demand which is behind our main result: the determinacy properties of current-and forward-looking monetary policy rules are much more similar than it appears to be the case based on the analyses conducted in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) , Huang and Meng (2007) , Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) and Huang et al. (2009) If we increase the degree of indexation (either in price-setting, as parametrized by , or in wage-setting, as measured by w ) the size of the indeterminacy region decreases. This is true not only for current-looking interest rate rules but also for forward-looking ones, as the forth and …fth rows of …gure 2 clearly show.
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Intuitively, an increase in current real economic activity has a stronger impact on the determination of (future) real interest rates if pricing decisions are a¤ected by past pricing decisions, or past wages.
Remedies
Next, we ask to what extent the indeterminacy problem can be mitigated, if the nominal interest rate is adjusted not only in response to in ‡ation but also as a function of past interest rates or current output, i.e., we now allow parameters r and y to be di¤erent from zero in (10). Those results are shown in the …rst two rows of …gure 3, where we introduce one change at a time with respect to the speci…cation underlying the results shown in …gure 1. The last set of results shows that monetary policy can render rational expectations equilibrium determinate if an interest rate rule is in place which combines the Taylor principle with interest rate smoothing and/or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to a measure of real economic activity. Also here, the intuition developed in Sveen and Weinke (2005) is useful to understand this result. First, interest rate smoothing implies that an increase in current real economic activity keeps being relevant for the determination of future (real) interest rates. This counteracts any tendency of the long real interest rate to drop. Second, adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to output also reduces the size of the non-standard indeterminacy area because this way the central bank reacts directly to any change in real economic activity. Taken together, this substantiates our earlier claim that, at least in a qualitative sense, we con…rm the results in Sveen and Weinke (2005) in the context of the medium-scale model which is used in the present paper.
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Finally, let us comment on another result in Huang and Meng (2009) . They analyze monetary policy rules prescribing that the nominal interest rate is adjusted not only in response to expected in ‡ation but also as a function of expected output.
They argue that those rules have stability properties that are crucially di¤erent from the ones implied by rules prescribing to adjust the nominal interest rate in response to current output. In order to relate to their analysis we also consider a forward-looking output response in the rule, i.e., the cases k = 0 and k = 1.
We …nd that their conclusion cannot be regarded as a general result. Indeed, the determinacy properties implied by those rules are almost identical in the context of our medium-scale model, as documented in the third row of …gure 3.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The intuition behind this result relies again on the simple fact that the timing of monetary policy matters very little for the implied stability properties if aggregate demand is reasonably smooth.
Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the fact that analyses of determinacy, i.e., local uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium, are generally conducted in the context of highly stylized models. In the present paper we use a medium-scale model which combines features that have been shown to explain fairly well postwar U.S. business cycles. Two results emerge. First, the empirically plausible design of monetary policy in the US since the early eighties 13 can explain the observed stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes, whereas the Taylor principle in itself cannot. This strengthens the practical relevance of some of our earlier results in Sveen and Weinke (2005) . Second, the stability properties of forward-looking interest rate rules are very similar to the corresponding outcomes under current-looking rules. The last result is in stark contrast with many …ndings that have been obtained in the related existing literature. We use our framework to explain why those results are not robust. 13 See, e.g., Woodford (2003, Ch. 1) for an overview of empirical studies on interest rate rules. 
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